\u3cem\u3eGarcetti\u3c/em\u3e\u27s Impact on the First Amendment Speech Rights of Federal Employees by Secunda, Paul M.
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW
Volume 7 | Issue 1 Article 7
9-1-2008
Garcetti's Impact on the First Amendment Speech
Rights of Federal Employees
Paul M. Secunda
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/falr
Part of the First Amendment Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in First Amendment
Law Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Paul M. Secunda, Garcetti's Impact on the First Amendment Speech Rights of Federal Employees, 7 First Amend. L. Rev. 117 (2018).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/falr/vol7/iss1/7
GARCETTrS IMPACT ON




Garcetti v. CeballosI does nothing less than redefine the whole
conception of what role public employees should play in ensuring the
fair and efficient administration of government services. Through its
holding, the Court has now made it nearly impossible for conscientious
public servants to speak out in the best interests of the public without
jeopardizing their careers. Yet, if possible, the situation is even worse
for federal employees.2
Garcetti is the watershed public employment free speech case that
drastically cuts down on public employees' First Amendment expression
rights while such employees are working pursuant to their official
Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. This paper
was presented at the 2008 First Amendment Law Review Symposium, Public
Citizens, Public Servants-Free Speech in the Post-Garcetti Workplace at the
University of North Carolina School of Law. I am indebted for the feedback and
comments I received from numerous individuals at that event. I would also like to
thank specifically Rick Bales, Jeff Hirsch, Nancy Levit, and Helen Norton, for
valuable comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
2. This is an important issue because there are approximately two million
federal workers in the United States, William F. West & Robert F. Durant, Merit,
Management, and Neutral Competence: Lessons from the U.S. Merit Systems
Protection Board, FY 1988-FY 1997, 60 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 111, 112 (2000), and the
numbers continue to rise. Workplace Prof Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.co
m/laborprof blog/2008/04/public-employme.html (April 30, 2008) ("[T]he federal
government increased its workforce by 13,800 in the first three months of 2008.").
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3 4duties.3  In the name of managerial prerogative, federalism, and
separation of powers,5 Garcetti has the effect of making government less
transparent, accountable, and responsive. This is because public
employees are less secure in their ability to speak out against
governmental fraud, corruption, abuse, and waste without facing
retribution from their public employers.
The reason for Garcetti's magnified effect on federal employees
relates to three primary factors, which include: (1) the unique
administrative framework established for federal employees to vindicate
their First Amendment interests under the Civil Service Reform Act of
1978 (CSRA);6 (2) the inexpert nature of the Merit Systems Protection
Board (MSPB), the federal agency that has been delegated the power to
hear federal employees' First Amendment claims; and finally, (3) the
apparent inability of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, the court
delegated the authority to hear appeals from the MSPB, to understand the
nuances and subtleties of the Garcetti decision. The cumulative impact
of these factors is that federal employees, post-Garcetti, will have to
vindicate their rights to free speech in the workplace primarily through a
hodgepodge of civil service laws, grievances filed under collective
bargaining agreements, and ineffective federal whistleblower statutes.
When all of these fail, as they inevitably will, federal employees will
have to just tolerate the evisceration of their constitutional rights and stay
3. In determining what the employee's official duties are, "[t]he ... inquiry is
a practical one" and should focus on "the duties an employee actually is expected to
perform." Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424-25.
4. Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging First Amendment Law of Managerial
Prerogative, 77 FORDHAM L. REv. (forthcoming 2008) ("The Court's opinion [in
Garcetti] contains a sketch-concededly partial and somewhat obscure--of
managerial control over employee speech as essential if management is to be held
politically accountable for the performance of public institutions.").
5. See Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2573 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The Court has refused to establish a constitutional rule
that would require or allow 'permanent judicial intervention in the conduct of
governmental operations to a degree inconsistent with sound principles of federalism
and the separation of powers."' (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423 (2006))).
6. Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 5 U.S.C.).
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silent at work. Collectively as citizens, we are all the poorer for
tolerating this undemocratic state of affairs.7
This contribution to the Symposium proceeds in three parts. First,
it considers the problems presented by the Garcetti decision in all public
employment contexts and reviews in detail three recent court decisions to
document this impact. Second, it discusses briefly the peculiar system
established currently for federal employees to vindicate their
constitutional rights under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.
Finally, the third part illustrates how the lack of familiarity with, and
cavalier attitude towards, these types of claims by both the MSPB and
the Federal Circuit have magnified Garcetti's malignant impact for
federal employees.
THE GARCETTI PROBLEM GENERALLY
Before discussing the specific problem posed by the Garcetti
holding in the federal employment context, it is necessary to consider the
impact of the holding on all public employment free speech cases. To
accomplish that, the pre-Garcetti framework must also be considered. In
short, Garcetti's impact has been significant and from the standpoint of
the constitutional rights of public employees, catastrophic. 8 This adverse
7. In a recent paper, I offered a solution to this quandary based on my belief
that federal employees are not able to receive a meaningful remedy for their First
Amendment claims under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. Paul M. Secunda,
Whither the Pickering Rights of Federal Employees?, 79 U. COLO. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2008) (arguing that a Bivens implied constitutional right of action
should be available for federal employee First Amendment claims against their
agencies and supervisors). Of course, overturning or modifying Garcetti would also
have a salubrious effect on federal employee free speech rights.
8. For one prominent example, consider Dean Erwin Chemerinsky's take on
Garcetti: "Garcetti v. Ceballos means that there is no First Amendment protection
for such officers or other government employees who expose wrong-doing on the
job, even when it is truthful and of great public concern." Erwin Chemerinsky, The
Kennedy Court, 9 GREEN BAG 2D 335, 340-41 (2006); see also Charles W. Rhodes
IV, Public Employee Speech Rights Fall Prey to an Emerging Doctrinal Formalism,
15 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1173, 1193-94 (2007) ("Rather than the relatively
stable balancing process that had become familiar in these cases, the lower courts are
now confronted with an inexact classification prerequisite that is already generating
unpredictable results.").
119
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impact will be documented through three case studies in the third
subsection of this Part.
A. Pre-Garcetti Framework for Public Employee Speech
Prior to Garcetti, public employees' rights to free speech were
hampered by a bewildering array of case law that sought to lay out a
coherent framework for such claims. As Professor Kermit Roosevelt has
aptly observed, the difficulty in public employment law stems from the
fact that:
the participants are occupying multiple roles, and the
different roles possess very different rights and powers.
The government as sovereign generally may not punish
citizens for the content of their speech, but the
government as employer may demand that employees do
the job they were hired to do, and insofar as effective
performance of that job requires saying some things and
not others, it can control their speech. Correlatively,
individuals as citizens retain their rights to free speech,
but as employees they are subject to job-related
sanctions such as dismissal if their speech compromises
their performance. 9
To focus on the rights in this context of "individual as
employees" and "government as employer," the Court, in a number of
decisions from 1967 to 1983, set up a framework that primarily
examines: (1) whether the speech is on a matter of public concern,' ° (2)
9. Posting of Kermit Roosevelt to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/20
06/05/whos-afraid-of-ceballos.html (May 31, 2006, 5:15 PM).
10. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983). This type of speech
"typically [includes] matters concerning government policies that are of interest to
the public at large, a subject on which public employees are uniquely qualified to
comment." City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80 (2004) (per curiam).
Sometimes the question is asked whether the speech addresses a "matter of political,
social, or other concern to the community," Connick, 461 U.S. at 146, or whether it
is "a subject of legitimate news interest." City of San Diego, 543 U.S. at 83-84. In
many cases, the fact that a court decides that public employee speech is not on a
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a weighing of the relevant employee and employer interests," and (3) the
question of causation.'2 Additionally, issues of qualified immunity under
Section 1983 have to be resolved to determine individual, official
liability.' 3 Needless to say, and the complete framework need not be
rehearsed here, 14 even before Garcetti there was plenty of confusion and
plaintiffs had to negotiate many hurdles in this area of the law.
B. The Dawning of the Age of Garcetti
The initial hope for public employee advocates was that the Court
in Garcetti would better define the meaning of public concern and make
it somewhat easier for plaintiffs to prevail on their workplace speech
claims, especially where government misconduct or employee safety and
health were involved. In fact, had it not been for the untimely retirement
of Justice O'Connor in the summer of 2005,15 there is every indication
matter of public concern is why employees lose these cases. See, e.g., City of San
Diego, 543 U.S. at 84.
11. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). Under this balancing test,
first developed in the public school teacher context, a court weighs the First
Amendment interests of the employee as a citizen against the government interest in
running an efficient government service for the public. Id. at 568. If the balance
under Pickering favors the government, the public employee has no First
Amendment rights in the speech.
12. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 286-87 (1977). If the
public employer is successful in meeting its burden that it would have made the
same decision absent the protected conduct, there is again no liability. Id. at 285-86.
This is because "[tihe constitutional principle at stake is sufficiently vindicated if
such an employee is placed in no worse a position than if he had not engaged in the
conduct." Id.
13. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974). Qualified immunity
from individual damages is applicable if a reasonable person would not have known
that his or her conduct violated clearly established constitutional ights. Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) ("[G]overnment officials performing
discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional ights of which a reasonable person would have known.").
14. See Secunda, supra note 7 at 2, for a complete explanation of what I have
previously called "the free speech five-step."
15. Justice O'Connor gave notice of her resignation on July 1, 2005, and was
officially replaced by Justice Samuel Alito on his confirmation by the Senate on
January 31, 2006. J. O'Connor Retirement Announcement, http://www.supremecour
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that such a decision was forthcoming.16 With O'Connor on the Court,
Justice Souter's dissenting opinion would have possibly become the
majority decision and would have likely held:
that private and public interests in addressing official
wrongdoing and threats to health and safety can
outweigh the government's stake in the efficient
implementation of policy, and when they do public
employees who speak on these matters in the course of
their duties should be eligible to claim First Amendment
17protection.
Such a holding would have largely kept the Connick/Pickering
framework in place,' 8 with the added advantage that the balancing of
tus.gov/publicinfo/press/oconnor07OlO5.pdf, J. Alito Press Release, http://www.supr
emecourtus.gov/publicinfo/press/pr_-01-31-06.html. Consequently, Garcetti was
actually orally argued twice: once in the Fall of 2005 with Justice O'Connor on the
Court and then again in the Spring of 2006 with Justice Alito on the Court. FIRST
AMENDMENT LAW CENTER, First Amendment Library Case: Garcetti v. Ceballos,
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/faclibrary/case.aspx?case=Garcetti-v_
Ceballos. The conventional wisdom was that Garcetti was initially evenly-split 4-4
and that is why it had to be reargued. Id. Posting of Paul M. Secunda to Workplace
Prof Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof blog/2006/02/public_
employee.html (Feb. 18, 2006) ("Appearing to point to a 4-4 split in its membership
with the retirement of Justice O'Connor, the United States Supreme Court has
decided to rehear the public employee speech case of Garcetti v. Ceballos with
Justice Alito now as its ninth member. The Ceballos case had been originally argued
in mid-October 2005.").
16. See Posting of Marty Lederman to SCOTUSBlog, http://www.scotusblog.
com/wp/ceballos-v-garcetti-what-difference-will-alito-make/ (Feb. 19, 2006, 3:01
PM) ("The employee will lose, and there may even be a holding that a government
employee's speech in her "official capacity" is entitled to no constitutional
protection. Either or both of those results might have occurred even with Justice
O'Connor's vote-although I doubt it, as Justice Souter was probably assigned to
write the majority opinion.").
17. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 428 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting).
18. See Paul M. Secunda, The (Neglected) Importance of Being Lawrence: The
Constitutionalization of Public Employee Rights to Decisional Non-Interference in
Private Affairs, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85, 99 (2006), for an explanation of the
ConnickiPickering framework pre-Garcetti.
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interests would presumably have shifted toward employees in cases
involving official wrongdoing or threats to health and safety.' 9
Instead, with Justice O'Connor's retirement and her replacement
by Justice Alito, Justice Kennedy's opinion became the majority opinion.
Rather than Justice Souter's nuanced balancing of the relevant interests,
Justice Kennedy set up a bright-line rule, with a distinctly pro-employer
flavor, and determined that public employees are not speaking as citizensS20
when they make statements pursuant to their official duties. As a
result, this rule means, at the very least, "that when part of an employee's
job is the production of certain speech, he or she can be dismissed if that
speech is deemed unsatisfactory."'
Consistent with Justice Stevens' dissent in Garcetti, I reject the
dichotomous, overly-formalistic view of a public employee as either
22being a citizen or worker, but never simultaneously both. To quote
Justice Stevens at some length: "[P]ublic employees are still citizens
while they are in the office. The notion that there is a categorical
difference between speaking as a citizen and speaking in the course of
one's employment is quite wrong. 23
Perhaps even more detrimental in the long-term, as established in
the case illustrations in the next section, Garcetti sets up faulty incentives
19. This approach appears to be close to the incremental one championed by
Professor George Rutherglen: "When [employer legitimate interests] are present, the
employee's protection necessarily is more limited, as it is under whistleblower
statutes that protect only complaints about specific forms of workplace misconduct.
... Progress ... must be made incrementally, by identifying those areas in which the
public employees' [sic] right to speak and the public's right to know can be
protected at an acceptable cost." See George Rutherglen, Public Employees, Free
Expression and the First Amendment (Univ. of VA. Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Working Paper Series, Paper No. 85, 2008), available at http://law.bepress.com/uva
lwps/uva-publiclaw/art85.
20. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
21. Roosevelt, supra note 9, at 3.
22. See 7th Cir.: Illustrating the Madness Which is Garcetti, http://lawprofesso
rs.typepad.comlaborprof blog/2007/07/7th-cir-illustr.htm (July 18, 2007), dis-
cussing the formalism of the Garcetti framework.
23. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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that force public employees to complain outside of work so they can get
the protection of being a "citizen. 24
C. Garcetti's Impact: Case Studies
Garcetti's impact can best be explored by examining in some
depth representative appellate and district court decisions in the last two
- 21years that have relied on the Garcetti holding.
1. Davis v. McKinney
In Davis v. McKinney,2 6 Cynthia Davis filed a lawsuit against a
number of individual defendants and different entities of the University
of Texas ("UT") System. Davis had been the IS Audit Manager at the
UT Health Science Center in Houston, Texas ("UTHSC-H"). Davis' job
duties included overseeing computer-related audits and creating audit
summaries and reports. 27
After applying for a promotion, Davis was involved in an audit
investigation of physicians' computers and identified eleven computers
that were believed to have intentionally accessed pornography, including
some she believed that had accessed child pornography. 28 Davis asked
her direct supervisor to be taken off the investigation because she felt
"the requirement that she review repugnant pornography demeaned her
24. These cases are representative, but are contrary to what Justice Kennedy in
Garcetti had hoped would happen: "A public employer that wishes to encourage its
employees to voice concerns privately retains the option of instituting internal
policies and procedures that are receptive to employee criticism. Giving employees
an internal forum for their speech will discourage them from concluding that the
safest avenue of expression is to state their views in public." Id. at 424.
25. One recent study conducted by the Committee on State and Local
Government Collective Bargaining and Employment Law of the Section of Labor
and Employment Law of the American Bar Association found that public employees
in 2007 lost twenty-one out of twenty-five (or 84%) of these Garcetti cases on the
appellate level. See Steven Rynecki et al., Subcommittee Report: Federal Appellate
Decisions on Constitutional Issues-First Amendment, 2008 MID-YEAR MEETING,
Feb. 1, 2008.
26. 518 F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 2008).
27. Id. at 307.
28. Id. at 307-8.
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as a woman."'29 Because Davis felt she was also being harassed by those
employees and supervisors who did not want her to continue with her
investigation, she wrote an internal complaint letter regarding the
"unethical and allegedly illegal" activity directed at her, alleging, "that
upper management had a pattern of sweeping pornography investigations
under the rug and not terminating or disciplining offending
employees., 30 Davis' letter stated that she had contacted the FBI
concerning the possible child pornography and the EEOC about
discriminatory practices against her. She did not receive the promotion
for which she had previously applied and claimed constructive discharge
and retaliation after she resigned.3'
What makes a case like this unique is that without the public
employment angle, this would be a fairly run-of-the-mill Title V11
32
discrimination and retaliation case. But because these events transpired
in the public workplace, Davis alleged that her employer violated her
First Amendment free speech rights by retaliating against her for
33
speaking out on matters of public concern.
Garcetti changes everything at this point. Rather than first asking
whether Davis complained about a private personnel matter or a matter
of public concern (which was the threshold question under Connick v.
Myers),34 Garcetti now requires at the threshold a determination of
whether the employee was acting pursuant to her professional duties or
merely speaking as a citizen.35 This inquiry is not merely about the job
title one has, but what functions one actually carries out.
6
29. Id. at 308.
30. Id. at 309.
31. Id. at 309-310.
32. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17
(2000).
33. Davis, 518 F.3d at 310.
34. Id. at 311.
35. Id. at 311-312 ("Garcetti changed this analysis in ways not yet fully
determined .... While all implications of Garcetti have not been developed at this
point, it is clear that Garcetti added a threshold layer to our previous analysis.").
36. Id. at 312 ("[Garcetti] provides some guidance, indicating that a formal job
description is not dispositive ... , nor is the fact that the speech relates tangentially
to the subject matter of one's employment .... The case also lists examples of
prototypical protected speech by public employees, namely 'mak[ing] a public
statement, discuss[ing] politics with a coworker, writ[ing] a letter to newspapers or
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW
There is also much controversy in these cases where the employee
is an investigator of some sort and the question is whether she is merely
performing her job or going beyond her normal job functions by
reporting misconduct by others in the organization. In this regard, the
Davis court pointed to an emerging principle that,
[c]ases from other circuits are consistent in holding that
when a public employee raises complaints or concerns
up the chain of command at his workplace about his job
duties, that speech is undertaken in the course of
performing his job .... If however a public employee
takes his job concerns to persons outside the work place
in addition to raising them up the chain of command at
his workplace, then those external communications are
ordinarily not made as an employee, but as a citizen.37
In other words, it appears that the Garcetti question is beginning
to turn on whether one is an internal or external whistleblower (which
incidentally is how some states define the scope of their own
whistleblower statutes). 38 Under this analysis, Davis was considered an
external whistleblower for some of her statements and an internal
whistleblower for others.39 She was only allowed to proceed on herS 40
external complaints.
legislators, or otherwise speak[ing] as a citizen." (citing Spiegla v. Hull, 481 F.3d
961, 967 (7th Cir. 2007)).
37. Id. at 313.
38. The court does, however, state that the fact that the complaint is internal is
not dispositive. Id. at 313 n.3. For different state approaches to whistleblower
statutes based on internal versus external whistleblowing, compare New Jersey
Conscientious Employee Protection Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-3 (2006) (applying
to internal whistleblowing) with CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5 (2004) (applying only to
employees who engage in whistleblowing externally to "a government or law
enforcement agency").
39. Davis, 518 F.3d at 315 (discussing which statements were written as an
employee and which statements were not written as part of Davis' job duties).
40. Davis, 518 F.3d at 317-18. But Davis still has a very long road ahead of
her if she is ultimately to prevail: on remand, she must still show she was speaking
on matters of public concern, Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983), that her
First Amendment interests outweighed her employer's efficiency interests (the
[Vol. 7
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This case represents a classic example where public employees
are being given an incentive to air the dirty laundry of their public
dmployers to gain constitutional protection. In fact, Davis might have
done well, at least for her constitutional claim, not to complain internally
at all. The moral of the Garcetti story appears to be to go directly to an
external agency, do not pass Go, and certainly do not attempt to resolve
internally. Needless to say, this state of affairs leads to a tremendous
waste of judicial resources on unnecessary litigation that might have
been resolved internally. It is also counter to other areas of employment
law (see sexual harassment law cases under Title VII such as Burlington
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton42 and
ERISA 43 denial of benefit cases such as Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Bruch44) under which employees are required to first exhaust internal
procedures before filing an external complaint.45 Of course, even if
courts interpreting Garcetti would not push public employees towards
external reporting, they would still need to provide some protection to
these employees by not too expansively defining job duties, as the next
case illustrates.
Pickering balancing test), Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968), that
her employer would not have made the same decision absent this protected conduct
(Mt. Healthy test), Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 286-87
(1977), and that it was not objectively reasonable for the defendant officials to take
the actions they did given what were then clearly established constitutional rights
(qualified immunity issue), Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Phew! It
is amazing anyone even bothers to bring this type of complaint.
41. 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (requiring employers to exercise reasonable care
to prevent and correct harassment and requiring employees to not act unreasonably
in preventing and correcting harassment or otherwise avoid harm).
42. 524 U.S. 775, 805 (1998) (same).
43. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-
1461 (2000).
44. 489 U.S. 101, 109 (1989) (requiring exhaustion of internal appeals before
filing benefits claim in ERISA cases).
45. Scott Moss, Fighting Discrimination While Fighting Litigation: A Tale of
Two Supreme Courts, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 981, 981 (2007) (establishing that the
Supreme Court has adopted the policy of requiring employees to try internal dispute
resolution before suing--or lose their claims.).
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2. Morales v. Jones
The public employee free speech carnage continues in Morales v.
Jones.4  One would think that when a police officer reports to an
assistant district attorney that his police chief is harboring a felon, and is
then reassigned to street patrol for his trouble, that he would be
considered to have engaged in speech on a matter of public concern
potentially protected under the First Amendment.47  Not so under
Garcetti and the wide scope given to what counts as official capacity
speech.
The Seventh Circuit in Morales reversed a jury verdict in favor of
the police officer and found that this type of speech was pursuant to the
police officer's official duties and therefore, not protected by the First
Amendment.49
The dissenting judge in Morales makes the point that the police
officer was not required as a part of his job to report the chiefs conduct
to the assistant district attorney:
At the time, Lt. Morales was on duty, delivering a report
he was obliged to deliver, and assisting the district
attorney in Vincent Ray's prosecution. However, as Lt.
Morales testified, although he was obliged to deliver the
report and assist in Ray's prosecution, he was not
obliged to report his suspicions about why the report
46. 494 F.3d 590 (7th Cir. 2007).
47. Id. at 593-95.
48. Id. at 597-98. But again a distinction was made between internal speech
and external speech. Id. at 597. Although the officer received no protection for his
internal complaints, the exact same speech made in response to a subpoena in a civil
suit was not pursuant to his official duties. Id. at 598. The court therefore remanded
the case for a new trial so that a jury could be properly instructed about the
"protected" and "unprotected" aspects of the same speech. Id.
49. Id. at 598 ("Being deposed in a civil suit pursuant to a subpoena was
unquestionably not one of Morales' job duties because it was not part of what he was
employed to do. Nonetheless, Morales testified about speech he made pursuant to
his official duties and we must determine whether that fact renders his deposition
unprotected. We hold that it does not.").
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page was missing. R. 144 at 628, 641, 646. In disclosing
his suspicions, he went beyond his work duties.
5 °
So it is astonishing that, "[the police officer's] demotion for
truthfully reporting allegations of misconduct may be morally repugnant,
[but] after Garcetti [ ] does not offend the First Amendment."51 But
courts seem to be giving inappropriate, wide latitude to employer
assertions as to what makes up the job of their employees. By doing so,
and this is clear in Morales, courts appear hesitant to go through the
record more thoroughly and second-guess employers' contentions when
necessary.
The result of court's "taking the employer's word on it," is that
public employee free speech protections have been diminished. But even
if the conduct had been part of the employee's job as the majority found,
why isn't it possible for some speech to be speech as a citizen on a
matter of community concern? Especially where your boss is
committing a serious crime. The answer is: only because the Court's
opinion in Garcetti requires a nineteenth-century formalism of this type.
3. O'Dea v. Shea
Finally, a representative district court case illustrates the impact
of Garcetti on not only trial courts, but how employer attorneys are
beginning to react to Garcetti and strategically advise their public
employer clients. In O'Dea v. Shea,52 the court granted summary
judgment to a state employer where the employee claimed that she was
given a poor performance review in retaliation for speaking out on a
53
matter of public concern.
It appears that the court could have decided this case more easily
based on the fact that the disputed performance review appeared to be a
purely private employment dispute between O'Dea and her employer.
54
50. Id. at 598.
51. Id. at 599.
52. No. 3:04-cv-1214 (D. Conn. Sept. 4, 2007).
53. Id. at 6.
54. Id. at 1-2 ("In the Spring of 2004, Shea purchased refurbished used
furniture for the Detoxification Unit at the hospital. When O'Dea found out about
FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW
Instead, the court reached for the conclusion that Garcetti controlled the
case: "[A]n employee may still be performing his job when he speaks,
even if that expression is not demanded of him."'55 This seems to mean
that even if the job description does not technically include the speech at
issue, the scope of covered speech can be magically expanded to include
even that expression "not demanded of him., 56 Here, raising concerns
about insect-infested furniture becomes part of her job functions because
she decides to talk about it! 57 The lesson: don't concern yourself about
things at the public workplace that are not in your job description or else
they will become part of your job description. This form of circular
reasoning could make everything anyone ever discusses at work
Garcetti-unprotected speech. Needless to say, the court concluded that
the employee raised her concerns in her professional capacity and
therefore, her speech was not protected by the First Amendment. 58
One prominent management-side employment law blogger
responded to this decision by suggesting:
For employers that are considering revising an
employee's job duties or position description, it makes
sense to include a reference to reporting safety or other
concerns (if that is a legitimate part of the job). Although
the employer may believe that this is implicit in
particular jobs, it is helpful to have this established at a
neutral point in time in writing-rather than as a
company policy.
59
the purchase, she spoke with Shea, in Shea's office, about her concern that use of
refurbished furniture in a medical unit 'raises a lot of health care issue [sic].'
According to O'Dea, she was concerned that bringing used furniture into the facility
would lead to more insect infestations.").
55. Id. at 5.
56. Id.
57. See Id. at 6 (explaining that speech was a part of O'Dea's employment as a
social worker).
58. Id. at 6.
59. Daniel A. Schwartz, First Amendment Claim Denied Where Employee's
Duties Included Raising Issues About Patient Safety, CONNECTICUT EMPLOYMENT
LAw BLOG, http://www.ctemploymentlawblog.com/2007/10/articles/decisions-and-
rulings/first-amendment-claim-denied-where-employees-duties-included-raising-
issues-about-patient-safety/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2007, 9:51 AM).
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So First Amendment rights of public employees may rise or fall
on how an employer drafts a job description and whether an employer
expressly places reporting obligations in that description. Even if the
employer does not follow this sage advice for this Kafka-esque world,
the O'Dea decision stands for the proposition that job responsibilities
will be considered broadly to deprive borderline, voluntary speech of
constitutional protection.
II. FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
UNDER THE CSRA OF 1978
Given this unfortunate state of affairs, how can things get even
worse for federal employees? The answer stems from the peculiar
manner in which federal employees must bring their constitutional
claims, including First Amendment free speech claims.
Federal employees do not have a section 1983-type civil rights
action against federal officials and their agencies. In the absence of
such a statutory vehicle, federal employees have sought in the past to
rely on the implied, judicially-created cause of action in Bivens v. Six
Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.61 However, since
the 1983 Supreme Court decision of Bush v. Lucas,62 federal employees
have not been able to use Bivens to bring First Amendment speech
claims against their government employers.63 Instead, federal employees
must proceed under a collective bargaining agreement grievance scheme,
60. This is strange because "the Court has argued for parallel treatment of state
and federal employees who violate the constitutional rights of others." Secunda,
supra note 7 (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 499 (1978)).
61. 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971) (holding that citizen has an implied Fourth
Amendment constitutional private right of action against federal officials for
violating his rights against unreasonable search and seizure).
62. 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
63. I have argued for the "reinvigoration of federal employee's First
Amendment free speech rights through overturning the decision in Bush v. Lucas
and implying a direct Bivens remedy." Secunda supra note 7, at 2. However, given
the recent miserly reading to Bivens rights in Wilkie v. Robbins, the likelihood of this
development in the short-term is highly unlikely. 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2618 (2007).
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64
if they come under one, or civil service regulations promulgated under
the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA of 1978).65 Under this
civil service scheme, damages are limited to equitable relief and back
pay, employees are not eligible for compensatory or punitive damages,
and attorney's fees are awarded on a more discretionary basis than other
66
civil rights statutes.
As far as the efficacy of collective bargaining regimes in
protecting the First Amendment speech rights of federal employees is
concerned, a couple of critical points need to be made. First, these
contractual avenues for relief do not focus on the constitutional issues at
stake in the same way that a federal court might. This is because the
issue is not whether the Constitution has been violated, but whether the
federal agency had "just cause" to take the employment action against
67the employee. The arbitrator, who is appointed by the parties to
interpret the collective bargaining agreement, may look at constitutional
64. 5 C.F.R. § 752.405(b) (2008) (covered federal employees may appeal an
adverse employment decision under an applicable, internal grievance procedure or to
an Administrative Judge (AJ) designated by the MSPB, but not both); see also Local
2578, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 711 F.2d 261, 264
n. 11 (D.C. Cir. 1983). S. Barry Paisner & Michelle R. Haubert-Barela, Correcting
the Imbalance: The New Mexico Public Employee Bargaining Act and The Statutory
Rights Provided to Public Employees, 37 N.M. L. REV. 357, 372 (2007) ("[S]ection
7121 provides that all collective bargaining agreements entered into pursuant to the
provisions of the CSRA must contain a 'negotiated grievance procedure' by which
federal employees can pursue any claims that they may have arising under the
collective bargaining agreement.").
65. Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 5 U.S.C.). This is because the Court concluded in Bush that there is an
effective alternative remedy under the Civil Service Commission regulations for
such claims. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388 (1983). The Court also found that
there were "special factors counseling hesitation," including Congress' institutional
competence in crafting appropriate relief for aggrieved federal employees. Id. at
380.
66. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7701(g), 1221(g), 1214(g) (2006); 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.201-
1201.203 (2008).
67. See Michael L. Wells, Section 1983, The First Amendment, and Public
Employee Speech: Shaping the Right To Fit the Remedy (and Vice Versa), 35 GA. L.
REV. 939, 940 n.4 (2001) ("[P]ublic employee unions typically negotiate rights not
to be fired without just cause, which in turn place limits on the authority of
government agencies to fire workers who speak out.").
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law to get a sense of whether the action was just,68 but that is not the
same thing as having a court consider the elements of a legal claim made
under the Constitution. So although employees may be successful
grieving their claim instead of going the MPSB route (and anecdotally, it
appears more are going the arbitration route given the current state of
69affairs discussed in more detail below), they are not receiving the First
Amendment protection to which they are entitled and this may prove
pivotal in some cases.70
A federal employee who chooses to forgo the negotiated
grievance procedure route may instead proceed under the civil service
laws. Whether an employee wishes to have his or her claims heard under
a federal whistleblower statute like the Whistleblower Protection Act of
71 721989,71 civil service regulations, or the First Amendment of the
Constitution, such claims must be brought under the CSRA. With regard
to constitutional claims, this is because the Supreme Court held in Bush
68. Marvin F. Hill, Jr. & James A. Wright, Employee Refusals to Cooperate in
Internal Investigations: "Into The Woods" with Employers, Courts, and Labor
Arbitrators, 56 Mo. L. REv. 869, 892 n.132 (1991) ("[T]he rule of law in the federal
sector is clear: arbitrators must consider external law, and the U.S. Constitution is
the supreme law.") (citing U.S. Dep't of the Treasury v. Nat'l Treasury Employees
Union Local 183, 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1209, 1214 (1984) (Kaplan, Arb.)).
69. See Don Cheney, Postal Employees Should Think Twice Before Appealing
Case to MSPB, POSTALREPORTER.COM BLOG, http://www.postalreporter.com/news
/2007/02/12/postal-employees-should-think-twice-before-appealing-case-to-mspb
(Feb. 12, 2007) ("Kenneth Jones vs. US Postal Service [216 F. App'x 986 (Fed. Cir.
2007)], illustrates why postal employees should think twice before appealing their
discipline to the Merit Systems Protection Board. They have a better chance of
success in the grievance procedure." (citation added)).
70. See Joseph E. Slater, The "American Rule" That Swallows The Exceptions,
11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 53, 103 (2007) ("Even with just cause protection,
workers in the unionized or public sector can and routinely are fired.").
71. Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (1989) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 1211-
1219, 1221, 1222, 3352 (2000)).
72. Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 5 U.S.C.). The CSRA of 1978 establishes specific "prohibited personnel
practices," including unlawfully discriminatory actions, politically coercive actions,
and retaliatory actions for whistleblowing. 5 U.S.C. §§ 2302(b)(1), (3), (8), (9)
(2006). For an employee to be removed from their position, the burden is on the
agency to show that such a removal would "promote the efficiency of the service." 5
U.S.C. § 7513(a) (2006); id. § 7701(c)(1) (2006) (placing the burden on the agency
as far as the merits of the case); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(a)(1)(ii) (2008).
FIRST AMENDMENT LA W RE VIEW rvol. 7
that the CSRA administrative scheme provides an adequate, alternative
remedy for such claims.73
The civil service template means that after federal employees
suffer a violation of their constitutional rights in the workplace through
an adverse employment action, they must appeal the decision of their
agency first to an administrative judge (AJ) designated by the Merit
Systems Protection Board (MSPB) at one of five regional offices across
the country.74 Thereafter, if the employee loses at the AJ level, he or she
may file a petition for review (PFR) with the MSPB itself.75 The MSPB
hears very few of these appeals (approximately 10 percent) because of a
highly deferential standard of review.
76
Regardless of whether the MSPB grants the PFR, the employee
may appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,77 the
court designated by Congress to hear such claims since 198 2 ." The
appellate court's review is also severely circumscribed, and the AJ or
MSPB's decision may be overturned only if deemed something akin to
arbitrary and capricious. 79 Historically, the AJ and MSPB have been
73. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388 (1983).
74. 5 C.F.R. § 752.405(b) (2008); 5 U.S.C. § 1204(g) (2006) ("The Board may
delegate the performance of any of its administrative functions under this title to any
employee of the Board."); see also West & Durant, supra note 2, at 120.
75. West & Durant, supra note 2, at 113.
76. In recent years, there have been between 1,000 and 2,000 PFRs, with the
large majority (anywhere from 84% to 94%) resulting in the Board not changing the
AJ decision. Id. at 115 (Table 2 statistics from 1988-1997). Petitions are granted
"only when significant new evidence is presented to [the MSPB] that was not
available for consideration earlier or when the administrative judge made an error
interpreting a law or regulation." Heaganns v. Dep't of Defense, 101 M.S.P.R. 159,
160 (2006), 2006 M.S.P.B. 28, 1 (citing 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).
77. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1), (b)(1) (2006).
78. Federal Court Improvement Act of 1982, 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (a)(9) (2006).
79. "The decision of the MSPB must be affirmed unless we find it to be
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law;
obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been
followed; or unsupported by substantial evidence." Holland v. Dep't of Air Force,
31 F.3d 1118, 1120 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c)). For a more
complete summary of CSRA procedure, see Secunda, supra note 7.
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affirmed 93 percent of the time. 80 Comparative judicial affirmance rates
by similar federal agencies lie in the 75 percent to 83 percent range.81
As a result of this intricate framework and the substantial
deference given to federal agency employers by the relevant
adjudicators, perhaps it is not surprising that the CSRA administrative
scheme is not vindicating the speech rights of federal employees. I
recently laid out the extent of the problem in a comprehensive analysis of
all MSPB and Federal Circuit cases involving the constitutional free
speech claims of federal employees. 8' The study established that not a
single one of these types of claims had ever been successful on the merits
before the MSPB or Federal Circuit. I therefore concluded that, "[t]he
message that federal employees are apparently receiving is that their First
• , ,84
Amendment claims will not be treated seriously.
80. Merit Systems Protection Board, FY 2006 Performance and Accountability
Report (PAR) 11 (Nov. 15, 2006), http://www.mspb.gov/netsearch/viewdocs.aspx?d
ocnumber=277562&version=27787 1&application=ACROBAT.
81. See Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An
Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1022 (1990)
(finding that in 1984-85, federal circuit courts affirmed in full 75% of NLRB orders,
83% of Immigration and Naturalization Service orders, and 81% of Patent and
Trademark Office orders).
82. Secunda, supra note 7.
83. Id.
84. See Paul M. Secunda, Sound Off: Federal Employees Face a Stunning
Lack of Protection for Free Speech, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 22, 2007 at 60. I also
pointed out that federal employees could not take solace in the existence of
whistleblower statutes, such as the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 (WPA),
Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 32 (1989) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 1211-1219, 1221,
1222, 3352 (2000)), even though this was one of the arguments advanced for
limiting First Amendment speech rights of public employees in Garcetti. See
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006) ("The dictates of sound judgment are
reinforced by the powerful network of legislative enactments-such as whistle-
blower protection laws and labor codes-available to those who seek to expose
wrongdoing."). This "powerful network" of whistleblower laws on the federal level
has led to largely ineffective relief. See Secunda, supra, note 7 ("[O]nly one of the
120 appeals brought by whistleblowers to the Federal Circuit since 1984 has
succeeded."). Relying exclusively on whistleblower protections also impoverishes
the value of constitutional rights and constitutional adjudication. See Davis v.
Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 242 (1979) ("[U]nless [constitutional] rights are to become
merely precatory ... litigants who allege that their own constitutional rights have
been violated, and who at the same time have no effective means other than the
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III. THE MAGNIFICATION OF GARCETTI'S IMPACT
CAUSED BY THE MSPB AND FEDERAL CIRCUIT
The ultimate issue with the administrative scheme under the
CSRA is that the MSPB and Federal Circuit have both misapplied the
holdings of Garcetti and completely failed to apply it at all in appropriate
cases. Whether this is because of unfamiliarity with applicable legal
doctrine or a good faith belief in the rightness of their decisions is really
beside the point. At the end of the day, these decisions have made it less
likely for federal employees to succeed on their free speech claims than
their comparatively-better-off state and local employee counterparts who
can proceed under section 1983 directly to federal court.
A. Federal Employees Lacking First Amendment Rights: Case Studies
The following section highlights the treatment of Garcetti cases
by the MSPB and Federal Circuit. It establishes how the lack of
familiarity and casual attitude towards this area of the law by these two
entities impacts federal employee free speech rights. The following
cases represent the extent of such cases in the two years since Garcetti:
one MSPB case where the Board applies Garcetti to the detriment of the
federal employee, one MSPB case where the Board should have applied
Garcetti, and one Federal Circuit case where the court also erred in
failing to apply Garcetti.
1. Chambers v. Department of the Interior
judiciary to enforce these rights, must be able to invoke the existing jurisdiction of
the courts for.., protection.").
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In Chambers v. Department of the Interior,85 the employee, the
former chief of the U.S. Park Police, warned about insufficient staff and
declining safety in the parks and parkways in the post-9/11 world. 86 Her
supervisor fired her when he discovered that she had shared her concerns
with The Washington Post.87 The Merit Systems Protection Board found
that her interview with The Washington Post was not protected First
88Amendment speech, based in part on the rationale in Garcetti. She
brought whistleblowing and First Amendment retaliation claims under
the civil service regulations after her official termination.89
The administrative judge upheld her dismissal, holding on the
First Amendment issue that she did not speak as a citizen and therefore,
under Garcetti, had no First Amendment protection." The Board
affirmed the AJ decision, specifically agreeing that her speech to the
reporter was pursuant to her official duties and thus not protected by the
First Amendment. 91 In support of this conclusion, the Board noted that
Chambers had contested a gag order that would not allow her to speak to
the press under any circumstance because it was her job to speak to the
press about agency issues.92
But the MSPB applied Garcetti in an incorrect manner. The
Board seems to think that whenever a federal employee talks to a
newspaper, the employee must be talking in an official capacity. Yet, the
Board fails to do the functional analysis of job responsibilities that
85. 103 M.S.P.R. 375 (2006), rev'd on other grounds, 515 F.3d 1362 (Fed.
Cir. 2008). The Federal Circuit reversed, 2-1, on Chamber's statutory
whistleblowing claim under the WPA. Reliance on the whistleblower claim rather
than on the First Amendment claim can be seen as diminishing the value of
constitutional adjudication of these issues. See Merit Systems Protection Board,
supra note 78. Nor do I believe that classifying the claim as a whistleblower one
takes it outside the Garcetti framework. This is because Chamber's claim is
simultaneously one between an employer and employee and one between the
government and a citizen.
86. Chambers, 103 M.S.P.R. at 378.
87. Id. at 380-81.
88. Id. at 392.
89. Id. at 381.
90. Id. at 392.
91. Id.
92. Chambers, 103 M.S.P.R. at 392.
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Garcetti requires.93 Was Chambers fulfilling her role as the public
spokesperson for the Park Police or was she reporting suspicions outside
of her job description? The facts of the case suggest the latter.
Moreover, the Board came to this conclusion even though the
Court in Garcetti specifically mentioned that public employees writing
letters to a newspaper on their own time would likely not be speaking
pursuant to official duties.94 Is there really a constitutionally-cognizable
difference between writing a letter to a newspaper on your own time, as
in Pickering, and giving your opinion to the paper when asked it on your
own time, as in Chambers? Regardless, it certainly was not Chambers'
"official duty" to criticize her employer for its security and budgetary
decisions. The Board majority's legal analysis is cursory on this point
and suggests either unfamiliarity with this area of the law or a glaring
indifference to the constitutional rights of federal employees.
95
93. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424-25 (2006).
94. Id. at 423 ("Employees who make public statements outside the course of
performing their official duties retain some possibility of First Amendment
protection because that is the kind of activity engaged in by citizens who do not
work for the government. The same goes for writing a letter to a local newspaper...
."1).
95. For safe measure, and because the case was filed prior to Garcetti, the
Board also concluded in the alternative that Chambers would have lost her case
under pre-Garcetti law. Chambers, 103 M.S.P.R. at 392, 2006 M.S.P.B. at 19-20.
Here, the Board found that although Chambers spoke out on a matter of public
concern, she lost out in the Pickering balance because police officers, and especially
chiefs of police, have less First Amendment protection than other public employees.
Id. at 393 ("[C]onsistent with the decisions cited above, the agency had an
overriding interest in not having the Chief of the Park Police publicly question
decisions made by officials who outranked her concerning the functions and budget
of the Park Police."). This categorical approach to Pickering balancing is at odds
with the required individualized balancing of interests, see Brown v. Dep't of
Transp., Fed. Aviation Auth., 735 F.2d 543, 548 (Fed. Cir. 1984), points to the fact
that there are problems with the MSPB's approach even beyond Garcetti, and makes
one wonder under what circumstance the Board would ever find in favor of First
Amendment speech rights for federal employees.
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2. Smith v. Department of Transportation
There is even less to commend in the Board's handling of Smith
96
v. Department of Transportation. Indeed, Garcetti is not even
mentioned in this case even though it should have been considered as a
threshold issue.97
Smith involved the thirty-day suspension of a Department of
Transportation employee for allegedly misusing government documents
to support his equal employment opportunity claim. 9s Smith claimed,
among other things, that the thirty-day suspension violated his First
Amendment rights to challenge the allegedly racially discriminatory
promotion decision.
99
Without considering whether Smith acted pursuant to his official
duties, the Board relies on the "public concern" test of Connick v.
Myers100 and the balancing of interests test under Pickering v. Board of
Education'0° to find no First Amendment free speech rights. This legal
analysis is troubling for three distinct reasons. First, more than a year
after the decision in Garcetti, the Board fails to recognize that a Garcetti
issue even exists. This omission probably did not impact the outcome of
the case because Smith's expression involved an external complaint, but
it does indicate lack of familiarity with this area of the law.
Second, the Board misconstrued the Pickering balance by placing
a heavy thumb on the scale in favor of the government's interests:
"Employees' free speech rights must be balanced ... against the need of
government agencies to exercise 'wide latitude in managing their offices,
without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First
Amendment.'"102 The "wide latitude" language relied upon by the Board
96. 106 M.S.P.R. 59 (2007).
97. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421; Roosevelt, supra note 9.
98. Smith, 106 M.S.P.R. at 63-64.
99. Id. at 78. Because the administrative judge sustained Smith's initial appeal
on other grounds, there was no need to discuss his First Amendment claims.
However, the First Amendment claim became relevant again when the Board
overturned some of the AJ's conclusions on the civil service provisions. Id.
100. 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983).
101. 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
102. Smith, 106 M.S.P.R. at 78 (quoting Mings v. Dep't of Justice, 813 F.2d
384, 387 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 146).
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concerns a completely different issue dealing with public concern.103
Third, and finally, the Board misunderstands the public concern speech
inquiry, even though it eventually assumes that Smith's expression
qualifies for the sake of argument.' °4 It wrongly found that Smith's
complaint has to be public to qualify as a matter of public concern, °5 and
incorrectly maintained that the filing of a discrimination claim that is
''personal in nature and limited to the complainant's own situation,"
involves a matter of purely private interest. °6
Smith therefore suggests that the MSPB lacks the necessary tools
to understand this complicated area of public employment law. 107 As a
result, federal employees' First Amendment rights to free speech
continue to be unnecessarily sacrificed.
103. "When employee expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any
matter of political, social, or other concern to the community, government officials
should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by
the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment." Connick, 461 U.S. at 146. So in
reality, only when public employee speech is on language not a matter of public
concern does the employer have wide latitude to manage its office, not when the
expression is important to public debate.
104. Smith, 106 M.S.P.R. at 80.
105. Id. at 79. But the Supreme Court clearly held in Givhan v. Western Line
Consolidated School District, 439 U.S. 410 (1979), that a racial discrimination
complaint made in a private conversation could still be on a matter of public
concern. Id. at 415-16. See also Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 386 (1987)
(holding that private, negative comments made about the assassination attempt on
President Reagan were on a matter of public concern).
106. Smith, 106 M.S.P.R. at 79. The Board's cursory conclusion that an EEO
complaint is merely personal in nature indicates a foundational misunderstanding of
the dual purposes of Title VII. The purpose of employment discrimination laws is
both to make the individual whole for unlawful discrimination and to vindicate the
public interest in eradicating employment discrimination from society as a whole.
EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 296 (2002); Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975). To say that an EEO complaint only serves one's
own purposes is to totally ignore the public interests vindicated by such laws and the
complaint filed by Smith. See Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 422 (establishing eradication
of discrimination throughout the economy as one of the central statutory purposes of
Title VII).
107. Alternatively, Smith may be about more than just a lack of competence,
but also indicative of the politics of a Republican-dominated Board. See Secunda,
supra note 7 (describing the membership of the M.S.P.B. during this period).
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3. What to Expect from the Federal Circuit in the Future
This lack of competence at the MSPB would be less worrisome if
there was meaningful judicial review by an Article III court. Yet, there
is no reason to believe that the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals will fill
that void if past history is any indication. Although the Federal Circuit
has yet to issue a Garcetti opinion as of April 2008,"' its record in
dealing with First Amendment claims pre-Garcetti does not inspire
confidence.
To review the recent attitude taken by the Federal Circuit towards
federal employee free speech claims just consider the last two cases the
Federal Circuit has ruled on in this context:
(1) King v. Depertmant of Veterans Affairs."109
King also argues that her statements were protected by
the First Amendment, but the government may restrict
speech if it 'reasonably believe[ ] [sic] [it] would disrupt
the office, undermine [a supervisor's] authority, and
destroy close working relationships.' The record
discloses substantial evidence to support a conclusion
that this is such a situation.' 10
(2) Kohl v. U.S. Postal Service 11
Kohl's First Amendment claim is without merit. Kohl
claims that the USPS sent him to the fitness for duty
examinations and removed him because he wrote letters.
108. It had the opportunity to apply Garcetti to a First Amendment issue in
King v. Dep 't of Veteran Affairs, discussed below, but found against the employee
based on the disruption caused by the employee's speech. 248 F. App'x 192, 194
(Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1468 (U.S. 2008).
109. 248 F. App'x 192 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
110. Id. at 194. (alterations in original) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138, 154 (1983)).
111. 115 F. App'x 49 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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• ..The administrative judge found that Kohl's hostile
letter-writing campaigns disrupted the workplace and
caused fear in other employees . . . . The First
Amendment does not require an agency to tolerate letters
that disrupt a government workplace and intimidate
other employees. 112
This is the sum total of what the Federal Circuit had to say in the
First Amendment free speech context in the last four years. Regardless
of the nature of the underlying facts of these cases, the court's cursory
analysis of First Amendment issues suggests strongly that it does not
sufficiently understand all the considerations that go into this legal, • 113
analysis. It is also noteworthy that the circuit court has only heard two
cases in the previous four years on this issue. I do not believe this is
because federal employees do not desire to bring these claims. It is much
more likely that, "federal employees are not bringing such claims
because there is no reason to think that such claims have any chance." 114
As for evidence of the Federal Circuit's lack of familiarity with
the public employee free speech framework under the First Amendment,
consider that the Federal Circuit has heard a total of seventy-nine First
Amendment cases in its twenty-five year existence, while hearing some
5,741 patent cases during that same period. 115 Now, with time comes
experience, but the affirmance rate suggests that the Federal Circuit is
none too eager to disagree with the MSPB on federal personnel matters.
Alternatively, and giving the court the benefit of the doubt, it might be
attributable to the fact that, "[m]any of [the Federal Circuit's] non-
precedential opinions are in pro se appeals by federal employees from
decisions of the Merit Systems Protection Board. Because these cases are
112. Id. at 52 (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 154).
113. To be fair, the Federal Circuit did a much better job addressing the
necessary analysis in Haddon v. Executive Residence at White House, 313 F.3d 1352
(Fed. Cir. 2002), by going through the necessary steps of the pre-Garcetti free
speech framework. But that case seems to be the exception to how these cases are
approached rather than the rule.
114. Secunda, supra note 7.
115. The queries run in the CTAF (Westlaw Federal Circuit database) were:
"'first amendment' % patent! copyright! trademark!" and "patent! and da (after
1982)," respectively.
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often poorly briefed, it is easy to miss potentially important legal issues.
• . ,,116 Yet, federal employees are not prisoners, and enjoy more
constitutional protections.
Either way, the Federal Circuit's track record of only finding for
agencies on federal employees' First Amendment Pickering claims pre-
Garcetti117 is dismal and hardly leads to the conclusion that the court will
apply Garcetti properly, let alone recognize its existence and the fact that
it is binding precedent.1 8 As a result, expect federal employee free
speech claims to continue to suffer an unjust fate in this post-Garcetti
world.
CONCLUSION
The combination of the peculiar scheme federal employees have
to vindicate their First Amendment free speech rights and the Garcetti
holding results in federal employees having less opportunity to speak
freely and promote needed transparency and accountability in the federal
government. This is a troubling state of affairs, as these employees are
our eyes and ears. Without them, it is impossible to keep track of the
multitude of programs that our federal government provides. Federal
employees are not going to speak out about wrongdoing, inefficiency, or
dangerous conditions if all that awaits them when all is said and done is
an unemployment check.
What is needed at this point is a courageous Supreme Court
decision that recognizes the error of its ways and the faulty incentive
system its current bright-line rule establishes.119 In any event, the time is
116. Penelope Pether, Sorcerers, Not Apprentices: How Judicial Clerks and
Staff Attorneys Impoverish U.S. Law, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 16 (2007) (citing ROBERT
TIMOTHY REAGAN ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., CITING UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS IN
FEDERAL APPEALS 75 app. (2005) (quoting Judge JF-2)).
117. See supra notes 76-78.
118. Smith v. Dep't of Transp., 106 M.S.P.R. 59, 80 (2007), 2007 M.S.P.B.
142, 24.
119. The overturning of Garcetti being unlikely in the short-term, Congress
could amend the CSRA to exempt First Amendment claims from its framework.
This line of attack, however, would also require an amendment to Section 1983 so
that federal employees could bring First Amendment claims using that procedural
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